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STATEMENT OF FACTS
An unusual situation has arisen in this case. The
prevailing party in the trial court, Outdoor Systems, Inc.
("Outdoor Systems"), is now attempting to disregard or rewrite
the facts as found by the trial court to justify the trial
court's Conclusions of Law. Appellant Bruce Bell & Associates,
Inc. ("Bell") agrees that the trial court's conclusions are not
supported by the trial court's findings, and it is for that
reason that the trial court must be reversed.
Outdoor Systems insists that the trial court's findings
leave some doubt as to whether the billboard provided under the
Advertising Agreement that is the subject of this action was
sufficiently visible from Interstate 19 to communicate the
advertising message.

All of the evidence and findings were to

the contrary of Outdoor Systems' position:

(a) Outdoor Systems'

representative Stephen Brossart testified that the graphics on
the sign were "not readily seen."

(Finding No. 32. )l (Mr.

Brossart further testified that Bell and its client did not get
the full value of their money for the sign provided.

x

[Trial

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are found at
Record No. 56-65. As in the Brief of Appellant, each reference
herein to this pleading will be to a specific numerical paragraph
of the "Findings" or "Conclusions." A copy of the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law was submitted as an addendum to the
Brief of Appellant.
1

Transcript p. 63].)

(b) The trial court further found that Larry

Pinnock drove by the sign three times, after the sign was in
place, and could not see the sign on the drive-bys.

(Finding No.

33.) (The evidence shows that on these occasions Mr. Pinnock was
actually looking for the sign. [Trial Transcript p. 70].)

(c)

The court further found that the sign was approximately 200 yards
from the point of optimal visibility in the oncoming lane of
traffic on Interstate 19.

(Finding No. 33.)

(d) Outdoor Systems

has pointed to absolutely no evidence presented that the
billboard was sufficiently visible from Interstate 19 to
effectively carry an advertising message.
Outdoor Systems makes much of the "approval" of the
sign by Kino Springs.

Yet, there was no evidence that the person

conducting the "drive-by" had any expertise with which to
evaluate the suitability of the sign as an advertising medium.
Stephen Brossart, Outdoor Systems' representative, specifically
testified at trial that no one ever indicated to him that the
person sent from Kino Springs to view the board had any
advertising expertise such as Brossart had.

(Testimony of

Stephen Brossart, Trial Transcript pp. 48-49.)
Nonetheless, Outdoor Systems takes great pains to
construe this "drive-by" by someone with no advertising
experience as blanket "approval" of the sign.

(It is interesting

to note that Outdoor Systems' pains are for no real purpose—none
2

of its legal or factual theories are based on any such
"approval.")
context.

However, any "approval" must be seen in its factual

A "drive-by" by someone with absolutely no advertising

experience cannot be said to be blanket and unqualified
"approval" of .the sign.

The most that occurred was that the

viewer verified that the sign existed in a particular geographic
location vis-a-vis Kino Springs.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court in this matter based its

conclusions on the erroneously narrow interpretation that the
duties of Outdoor Systems under the Advertising Agreement were
only to execute and affix art work to a billboard.

The

Advertising Agreement was, however, just what its name states—a
contract centered on Advertising.

Outdoor Systems was selling

advertising space, not just the services of affixing art work to
a billboard.

The trial court's interpretation is not supported

by the facts it found or well established legal principles and
Outdoor Systems has made no attempt to support the trial court's
interpretation.
2.

All of the evidence and the findings of the trial

court show that it is undisputed that the billboard leased by
Outdoor Systems to Bell could not be read from Interstate 19.
Bell, therefore, did not receive the intended consideration under

3

the Advertising Agreement.
occurred.

A material failure of consideration

The trial court's conclusions to the contrary are

based on erroneous legal principles and not supported by the
facts found by the trial court.
3.

Paragraph 10 of the Advertising Agreement places

duties on both parties to the agreement.

Bell fulfilled his

duties by notifying Outdoor Systems of a defect in the sign—the
objective fact that it could not be read by travelers along
Interstate 19.

Contrary to the parties duties under paragraph

10, Outdoor Systems refused to correct the defect unless Bell
bore the cost.

At this point Bell was entitled to take the only

option remaining to it—to repudiate the contract.
Bell did.

That is what

The trial court's interpretation of the Advertising

Agreement is error as a matter of law and must be reversed.
4.
of fact.

This case is a clear example of a mutual mistake

The Advertising Agreement was entered into by both

parties on the assumption that the subject billboard could
function as a suitable advertising medium.

The undisputed facts

found by the trial court are that the board could not so
function.

The parties were mistaken as to a material fact.

The

trial court's conclusions to the contrary are based on erroneous
legal principles and not supported by the facts it found.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST CONCLUSION OF LAW,
DEFINING THE DUTIES OF OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, IS
ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Outdoor Systems makes no effort in its brief to address
the deficiencies in the trial court's first conclusion of law
regarding the scope of Outdoor Systems' duties under the
Advertising Agreement.

This erroneous conclusion is the basis of

all other conclusions by the trial court.

Outdoor Systems

continues to contend that its duties under the Advertising
Agreement consisted of nothing more than to execute art work and
affix it to a billboard.

In at least one moment of candor,

however, Outdoor Systems specifically admits that its duties
extended beyond painting a billboard when it stated:

"The

consideration for the contract included Outdoor's promise to
paint and maintain an outdoor painted bulletin for a period of
twelve months. . . . "

Brief of Appellee, p. 6 (emphasis added).

If one reads both the first page and the second page of
the Advertising Agreement, it is clear that Outdoor Systems was a
lessor of billboard advertising space as well as a painter and
affixer.

These two roles were not separable but rather they ran

together as the full package of what was sold to Bell. To
ascertain whether there was a failure of consideration, a mutual
mistake, or a defect in performance, the court must look at the

5

entirety of what Outdoor Systems sold to Bell under the
Advertising Agreement.

In closing its eyes to Outdoor Systems'

role as a lessor in Conclusion No. 1, the trial court committed
error.

Outdoor Systems' failure to offer any support for that

conclusion simply underscores the existence of that error.
II.

THERE WAS A FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION UNDER THE
ADVERTISING AGREEMENT.

Bell has challenged both conclusions of law regarding
failure of consideration.

Outdoor Systems again has failed to

address the error in the trial court's conclusions.

Outdoor

Systems appears to agree with Bell that materiality is the
correct legal standard for evaluating an alleged failure of
consideration.

Brief of Appellee, pp. 5-6, citing Bentlev v.

Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984) (also cited by Bell in its
brief).

Yet, Outdoor Systems makes no attempt to defend the

trial court's erroneous legal conclusion that for a party to be
"without fault" it must be free of all negligence.
What Outdoor Systems does argue is that, under the
trial court's constricted interpretation of the Advertising
Agreement, there could be no failure of consideration because all
that was promised was to paint and maintain the sign.

For

Outdoor Systems, this assertion—which should be a starting
premise for discussion—is the final word.

Yet, this contention

clearly bypasses the fundamental inquiry in any attempt at

6

contract interpretation of ascertaining "the prime object and
purpose of the parties."
619, p. 733 (3d ed. 1961).

4 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts. §
The prime object of the Advertising

Agreement was more than the executing and affixing of some art
work to a billboard.

It included the lease of a billboard, to

which the art work was to be affixed, in a location that could be
seen by its intended audience—travelers on Interstate 19. There
is no dispute that Bell did not receive the intended
consideration.

There was a material failure of consideration and

the trial court committed error as a matter of law in concluding
otherwise.
III. BELL HAD THE RIGHT TO AND DID TIMELY REPUDIATE THE
ADVERTISING AGREEMENT.
Outdoor Systems has misconstrued the position of Bell
regarding the effect of paragraph 10 of the Advertising
Agreement.

Contrary to Outdoor System's assertions, Bell does

not claim that paragraph 10 gave Bell "an unlimited right to
terminate the contract if it found that the advertising was not
effective."

Brief of Appellee, p. 15.

Paragraph 10 in Outdoor Systems' standard contract
required Bell to "inspect the display within [blank] days after
installation."

It further provided that unless Bell, within the

number of days specified, notified Outdoor Systems of any defect,
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the display would conclusively be presumed to have been inspected
and approved for all purposes.
The trial court specifically held that Bell notified
Outdoor Systems of the defect in the sign within any applicable
time limits.

(Conclusion No. 4.)

Bell even proposed a way to

cure the defect—re-painting the sign as all graphics.
No. 26.)

(Finding

Outdoor Systems, however, refused to take any steps to

cure the defect unless Bell would bear the cost of the repainting.

At this point Bell had only one option—rejection of

the contract.
Paragraph 10 did not give Bell an unlimited right to
repudiate the contract nor does Bell so contend.
question was objective in nature.
sign's graphics could not be seen.

The defect in

No one disputes that the
It is little comfort to have

a lovely picture on a billboard with indecipherable garaphics.
Outdoor Systems was timely notified of this objective defect in
the sign.

Yet, Outdoor Systems refused to take any steps to

correct the defect unless Bell bore the cost.

The only

reasonable interpretation of paragraph 10 is that at that point,
with Outdoor Systems refusing to cure, Bell was entitled to
repudiate the contract.

That is exactly what Bell did.

Outdoor Systems' reliance on Resource Mcrmt. Co. v.
Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985), dealing with an absolute
right to repudiate a contract, is misplaced.
8

There was nothing

"absolute and arbitrary" about Bell's rejection.

The objective

fact was that the board in place did not advertise.
most fundamental "defect."

This was a

The trial court erred, as a matter of

law, in concluding that Bell did not have the right to repudiate
the Advertising Agreement on the facts the trial court found.
IV.

THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE, GIVING ALL REASONABLE
DOUBT TO OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, SHOWS THAT THE PARTIES
ENTERED INTO THE ADVERTISING AGREEMENT BASED ON A
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT.

The parties entered into an Advertising Agreement.

By

the name of the agreement, the parties declared the central
purpose of this contract to be "Advertising."

Outdoor Systems'

representative acknowledged at trial that the basic purpose and
goal of "advertising" is to grab the attention of the potential
customer and then to convey a message to that potential customer.
(Testimony of Stephen Brossart, Trial Transcript p. 36.) Both
parties clearly thought, at the time they entered into the
Advertising Agreement, that the sign proposed by Outdoor Systems
could grab the attention of potential customers traveling along
Interstate 19 and could convey a message to such travelers
regarding Kino Springs Golf Course.

The facts found by the trial

court, however, establish that both parties were mistaken and
that the location of the Outdoor Systems billboard made it
impossible for it to function effectively as an advertising
medium.
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Outdoor Systems claims that no mutual mistake of fact
occurred because Bell "assumed the risk" as to a future event.
However, the location and size of the board were objective facts,
not "future events."

Outdoor Systems did not set any limitations

on what could be placed on the board and Bell did not agree to
any.

Of course, Bell "assumed the risk" that the specific layout

and format of advertisement that Bell prepared would not be
sufficiently engaging to grab the attention of passing motorists
and convey a message about the desirability of stopping at Kino
Springs Golf Course.

But there is no evidence or legal principle

on which to base the proposition that Bell "assumed the risk"
that the billboard leased to carry that advertisement would not
be visible from Interstate 19. Rather, Bell entered into the
Advertising Agreement specifically to acquire an advertising
medium that could convey a message to Interstate 19 travelers.
Both parties were mistaken and neither Bell nor Outdoor Systems
"assumed the risk" that the board could not function as an
advertising medium.
Outdoor Systems' reliance on Blackhurst v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that Bell
"assumed the risk" of the visibility of the sign in misplaced.
The court in Blackhurst held that the parties to a personal
injury settlement agreement assumed the risk of an uncertainty—
future changes in the injured party's health.
10

In contrast, no

relevant facts regarding the billboard location changed or could
have changed after the parties entered into the Advertising
Agreement.
change.

The physical location of the billboard did not

The location of Interstate 19 did not change.

These

were not uncertainties or variables. At the time the parties
entered into the Advertising Agreement both parties reasonably
assumed the objective fact that the billboard would be a suitable
advertising medium.

It was not.

A mutual mistake occurred.

Outdoor Systems similarly mischaracterizes the facts in
labeling Bell's use of the sign as a "prediction."

Brief of

Appellee, p. 11. Moonev v. G.R. & Associates, 746 P.2d 1174
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), offers Outdoor Systems no comfort or
support.

In Moonev, the obligor on a promissory note sought to

avoid liability because the note was entered on the erroneous
belief that, after the making of the note, a security interest
would be filed collateralizing the note.

Like the settling

parties in Blackhurst, the Moonev obligor "assumed

the

occurrence of a future event—a variable that was by no means a
certainty.

The court held that no mutual mistake of fact

occurred because any mistake was as to an event to occur in the
future.

TA. at 1178.
The Advertising Agreement was not entered on the

assumption that some event would occur in the future. At the
time of entering into the Advertising Agreement, it was assumed
11

by both parties that the billboard could function as an
advertising medium.

No prediction of the future was involved.

No future event was contemplated by the parties that would effect
the billboard's ability to function as an advertising medium.

A

mutual mistake did occur and Moonev is inapposite.
Outdoor Systems also relies on Robert Langston, Ltd. v.
McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), and in so doing
undermines its earlier arguments.

In contrast to Moonev and

Blackhurst, Langston is a classic case of mutual mistake.

Both

parties to a contract were mistaken as to an objective fact—the
number of cattle existing on the ranch that was the subject of
the buy-sell contract.

The court rescinded the contract.

As in

Langston, the parties in this action made a mistake regarding an
objective fact, i.e., the fact that a sign 200 yards from the
point of optimal viewing cannot advertise.
Outdoor Systems resurrects the trial court's "at fault"
analysis with respect to mutual mistake.

Outdoor Systems seems

to claim that Bell erred when it chose not to have lettering the
full height and width of the board.

No doubt, block letters the

full height of the billboard saying "GOLF" vould have been more
visible from a distance than even two lines of lettering.

But,

as Outdoor Systems fully acknowledged at trial, effective
advertising must grab the potential customer's attention and
convey the desired message.

Bell, with Outdoor Systems' input,

designed an advertisement that would do just that but the board
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was not a sufficient vehicle for the message.

(There is no

suggestion that the advertisement designed by Bell was unusual or
extraordinary in any way.)2
CONCLUSION
The trial court's Conclusions of Law in this matter are
based on erroneous legal principles and at variance with its own
Findings of Fact.

Appellant Bruce Bell & Associates, Inc.

respectfully requests that this court reverse the judgment of the
trial court, direct judgment to be entered for appellant, and
award costs on appeal and attorneys' fees pursuant to the
Advertising Agreement and Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 to
appellant.
DATED this 2*P

day of March, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By yh^>
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s£rtf6 t . Olson/
Douglas C. Ting^y
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Bruce Bell &
Associates, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

2

Outdoor Systems' citation to Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649
P.2d 9 (Utah 1982) is puzzling. Certainly, the seller's mistake
as to the legal effect of a mortgage on the land in Kiahtipes
bears no resemblance to the clear mistake of objective fact
proven in the present action.
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